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F
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    ew violations of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) are more egregious 
than deliberately attacking civilians.1 While incidental civilian casualties are an 
unfortunate and legally tolerated consequence of the conduct of hostilities 
during armed conflict, nothing justifies making civilians the deliberate object 
of attack.2 Doing so is universally recognized as a war crime, whether in the 
context of an international or non-international armed conflict.3 Moreover, 
because deliberately attacking civilians is never justified by the LOAC, it also 
                                                                                                                      
1. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 72 (3d ed. 2016) (“The cardinal principle of distinction between 
civilians and combatants is the most fundamental pillar of LOIAC.”). 
2. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 130 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) (“The prohibition of attacks against 
civilians and the civilian population ‘does not mention any exceptions [and] does not con-
template derogating from this rule by invoking military necessity.’”). 
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 
Stat. 2574 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. (2012)) 
(2) ATTACKING CIVILIANS.—Any person subject to this chapter who intentionally en-
gages in an attack upon a civilian population as such, or individual civilians not taking active 
part in hostilities, shall be punished, if death results to one or more of the victims, by death 
or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct, and, if 
death does not result to any of the victims, by such punishment, other than death, as a 
military commission under this chapter may direct. 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 
U.N.T.S. 279; see also Press Release, Secretary-General, Deliberately Targeting Civilians ‘A 
War Crime’, Secretary-General Warns, Strongly Condemning Deadly Attack on Syria’s 
Aleppo University, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/14767 (Jan. 16, 2013) (“Deliberate targeting 
of civilians and civilian targets constitutes a war crime. Such heinous attacks are unaccepta-
ble and must stop immediately.”); MARCO SASSÒLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
RULES, CONTROVERSIES, AND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ARISING IN WARFARE 501, ¶ 
10.34 (2019) 
Most terrorist acts are committed either against civilians who are not in the hands of the 
terrorists or indiscriminately against civilians and combatants. In both IACs and NIACs, 
civilians may not be targeted, and ‘[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which 
is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited. 
DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 298–99 
With respect to War Crimes . . . [t]hey were covered by . . . Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, 51, [including 
51(7), which prohibited the presence or movement of the civilian population to shield mil-
itary objectives] of the Geneva Convention of 1929. That violation of these provisions con-
stituted crimes for which the guilty individuals were punishable is too well settled to admit 
of argument. 
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would qualify as a criminal homicide, indeed a presumptive murder, under 
the domestic law of any State.4 
The prohibition against deliberately attacking civilians is a corollary of 
the LOAC principle of distinction.5 This principle obligates parties to an 
armed conflict to distinguish constantly between lawful objects of attacks 
and all other persons, places, and things.6 Characterized as one of the four 
“cardinal” principles of the international humanitarian law by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, the principle is codified in two important treaties that 
regulate both international and non-international armed conflicts.7 In the 
context of international armed conflicts, Article 48 of Protocol I Additional 
(AP I) to the four Geneva Conventions provides: “In order to ensure respect 
for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties 
to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and ac-
cordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”8 In 
the context of a non-international armed conflict, Article 13 of Protocol II 
Additional (AP II) to the four Geneva Conventions states, “[t]he civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack.”9 These treaty provisions reflect the status of the distinction principle 
as a universally applicable obligation under customary international law. The 
universal applicability of this principle is further reinforced by the Interna-
                                                                                                                      
4. See DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 300 (“All members of the armed forces are subject to 
the military and criminal codes of the State that they serve, and in case of infraction they are 
liable to be prosecuted before domestic military or civil courts.”). 
5. Id. at 72. 
6. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]. 
7. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
Rep. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8) 
The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law 
are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; States 
must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently never use weapons 
that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets. 
AP I, supra note 6, art. 48; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
art. 13(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
8. AP I, supra note 6, art. 48. 
9. AP II, supra note 7, art. 13(2). 
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tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Customary International Humanitar-
ian Law study,10 as well as its treatment in the military manuals of numerous 
armed forces.11 
It is therefore unsurprising that most professional armed forces take sub-
stantial measures to ensure their personnel understand and comply with this 
cardinal LOAC principle.12 Despite these efforts, it is not possible to com-
pletely prevent civilian casualties resulting from the conduct of hostilities.13 
The unfortunate reality of armed conflict is that such casualties will often be 
                                                                                                                      
10. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 1, at 4 (Jean–Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald–Beck eds., 2005) (“Numerous military manuals, including 
those of States not, or not at the time, party to Additional Protocol I, stipulate that a dis-
tinction must be made between civilians and combatants and that it is prohibited to direct 
attacks against civilians.”) 
11. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL 63, § 2.5.2 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL] (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted) 
Distinction requires parties to a conflict to discriminate in conducting attacks against the en-
emy. On the one hand, consistent with military necessity, parties may make enemy combatants 
and other military objectives the object of attack. On the other hand, consistent with hu-
manity, parties may not make the civilian population and other protected persons and ob-
jects the object of attack. 
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES 
MARINE CORPS, FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF LAND WARFARE, 2-1–2-2, ¶ 2-6 (2019) [hereinafter COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF LAND WARFARE] 
In general, civilians may not be the object of direct (intentional) attack. LOAC attempts to 
protect civilians by requiring combatants to apply the principles of distinction and propor-
tionality, including by taking feasible precautions to avoid incidental harm to civilians when 
making decisions during armed conflicts. Commanders and their staffs utilize the risk man-
agement process to make informed decisions. Commanders should consider risk to mission, 
resources, and civilians. 
UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ¶ 2.5 (2004) (“Since military operations are to be conducted only against the 
enemy’s armed forces and military objectives, there must be a clear distinction between the 
armed forces and civilians, or between combatants and noncombatants, and between ob-
jects that might legitimately be attacked and those that are protected from attack.”). 
12. See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS, ADDP 06.4, LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT ¶ 5.53 (2006); CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (CANADA), B-GJ-005-104/FP-
021, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 429 
(2001). 
13. DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 149 (“Whatever the origin of an accident, it must be 
acknowledged that in wartime civilians regularly get killed or wounded—and civil objects 
are destroyed or damaged—without anyone wishing to cause such affliction.”). 
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the unavoidable incidental consequence of deliberately attacking lawful tar-
gets.14 The LOAC proportionality principle prohibits any attack against le-
gitimate targets when such incidental harm is assessed as excessive in relation 
to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage derived from the 
attack.15 By implication, the infliction of such incidental harm is legally tol-
erated so long as it is not assessed as excessive.16 
Many legal scholars have sought to better distinguish permissible and 
impermissible incidental civilian harm during the conduct of hostilities.17 
                                                                                                                      
14. Id. 
15. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(5)(b) (“[A]n attack which may be expected to cause inci-
dental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated.”); see also DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 188–89, § 5.2.2 (“Mili-
tary objectives may not be attacked when the expected incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, and damage to civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”); 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, r. 14, at 46–50. 
16. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 620–21, ¶ 1953 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDI-
TIONAL PROTOCOLS] 
The armed forces and their installations are objectives that may be attacked wherever they 
are, except when the attack could incidentally result in loss of human life among the civil-
ian population, injuries to civilians, and damage to civilian objects which would be excessive 
in relation to the expected direct and specific military advantage. In combat areas it often 
happens that purely civilian buildings or installations are occupied or used by the armed 
forces and such objectives may be attacked, provided that this does not result in excessive 
losses among the civilian population. 
17. See, e.g., SASSÒLI, supra note 3, at 521–22, ¶ 10.80 (“Admittedly, however, States and 
military lawyers have so far refused to quantify how the risk of losing one civilian life weighs 
in comparison to the potential of gaining a certain military advantage as well as when the 
relationship between the risk and the advantage becomes excessive.”); LESLIE GREEN, THE 
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 351 (2d ed. 2000) (“But there is no definition 
as to what is ‘excessive’, so that the decision must be made in accordance with reasonable 
military assessments and expectations, taking into account potential collateral damage 
caused to civilians, civilian objects and other protected persons or installations.”); HOWARD 
S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 85 (1986) (“It is, of course, 
impossible to measure human lives against a military advantage to be gained.”); A.V.P. Rog-
ers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 165, 169 (2000) 
(“Application of the principle of proportionality is more easily stated than applied in prac-
tice. . . . The law is not clear as to the degree of care required of the attacker and the degree 
of risk that he must be prepared to take. . . . There may be occasions when a commander 
will have to accept a higher level of risk to his own forces in order to avoid or reduce col-
lateral damage to the enemy’s civil population.”); Dale Stephens, Counterinsurgency and Stability 
Operations: A New Approach to Legal Interpretation, 86 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 289, 304 
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Nevertheless, military commanders are probably no closer to a clearly de-
fined standard today than when the proportionality principle was first codi-
fied in AP I in 1977.18 
Assessing proportionality is itself problematic due to the amorphous na-
ture of the concept of excessiveness: the touchstone of compliance. The dif-
ficulty of assessing proportionality is compounded by the fact that each life-
or-death judgment is necessarily contextual.19 Adding substantially to the 
complexity of these judgments is the reality that many organized armed 
groups routinely expose civilians to the dangers of hostilities, thus violating 
their obligation to take constant care to mitigate civilian harm.20 Many State 
armed forces view this tendency as a deliberate effort to complicate attack 
decisions by creating the inevitability of civilian casualties.21 
                                                                                                                      
(2010) (“The principle is one that has not easily been reconciled.”). 
18. Jason D. Wright, ‘Excessive’ Ambiguity: Analysing and Refining the Proportionality Stand-
ard, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 819, 833 (2012) 
The five-step collateral damage estimate methodology provides a useful institutional mech-
anism, but it fails to answer what constitutes excessive collateral damage and otherwise does 
not incorporate a fully integrated targeting analysis that applies IHL in the first instance. 
Considering conventional and customary IHL and US doctrine as a model of a particular 
state’s practice, legal advisers and other practitioners are still left with the central question 
concerning collateral damage—what is excessive? 
19. James Kilcup, Proportionality in Customary International Law: An Argument Against As-
pirational Laws of War, 17 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 244, 248 (2016) 
(“Given the vast variety of combat circumstances, a single detailed explication of propor-
tionality would be unworkable.”). 
20. Eric Talbot Jensen, Precautions against the Effects of Attacks in Urban Areas, 98 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147, 160–61 (2016) 
Human Rights Watch has noted a number of instances where the defender apparently failed 
to adequately segregate the civilian population and instead took actions that may have af-
firmatively violated the rule but that at minimum did not take advantage of available feasible 
alternatives, including ‘storing weapons and ammunition in populated areas and making no 
effort to remove the civilians under their control from the area’; ‘fir[ring] [rockets] directly 
from inhabited villages’; and ‘[taking] over civilian homes in the populated village, fir[ing] 
rockets close to homes, and driv[ing] through the village in at least one instance with weap-
ons in their cars. 
Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 292, 311 (2009) (“[D]uring Operation Iraqi Freedom 
the Saddam Fedayeen often engaged Coalition forces from behind women and children, 
many of whom were forcibly seized for the purpose.”). 
21. Jensen, supra note 20, at 168–69 (“It seems unlikely that the post-onset-of-hostilities 
commingling by Daesh of its military headquarters with a known jail is the type of activity 
States were anxious to protect when insisting on the principle of feasibility to cover the 
defender’s obligation. Their concern, as reflected in the discussion above, was to preserve a 
State’s ability to develop its military infrastructure based on its topography and workforce. 
There is no evidence that such a placement would facilitate Daesh’s ability to deal with 
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The obligation of the defending force to mitigate civilian risk is reflected 
in the well-established LOAC prohibition against using civilians to immunize 
targets from attacks, commonly referred to as the use of human shields.22 
Article 51(7) of AP I provides: 
 
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civil-
ians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from mili-
tary operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to 
the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or 
individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield military operations.23  
 
Clearly, the distinction and proportionality obligations imposed on an attack-
ing force alone are insufficient to protect civilians from incidental death and 
injury.24 Unless the defending force is equally committed to implementing 
                                                                                                                      
difficult topography or dense populations. Rather, as many modern scholars have argued, 
this and similar actions by defenders in recent armed conflicts seem more like attempts to 
use the law as a shield and to potentially immunize otherwise legitimate targets through the 
presence of civilians.”); Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Distinction, and the Long War: Guarding 
Against Conflation of Cause and Responsibility, 46 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 135, 
157 (2016) (“When presented with a range of tactical options, selecting the option that ex-
poses the most highly protected civilian property to attack is highly indicative of a deliberate 
violation of the passive distinction obligation.”); see also Laurie R. Blank, Taking Distinction to 
the Next Level: Accountability for Fighters’ Failure to Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL-
PARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 765, 797 (2012) (“Without robust enforcement of this 
key obligation for the protection of civilians, parties will continue to locate rocket launchers, 
military equipment, and other military objectives in civilian areas with impunity. The effect, 
unfortunately, is to endanger civilians rather than protect them.”). 
22. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, r. 97, at 337–
40. In full, Rule 97 states, “The use of human shields is prohibited.” Id. at 337. 
23. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(7). 
24. Jensen, supra note 20, at 156 
[W. Hays] Parks’ inference is clear: the most effective way to ensure the safety of the civilian 
population is for the defender to shoulder a significant portion of the responsibility. In fact, 
Parks argues that ‘[i]f the new rules of Protocol I are to have any credibility, the predominant 
responsibility must remain with the defender, who has control over the civilian population.’ 
This approach is also echoed in the new U.S. Law of War Manual, which states: ‘The party 
controlling civilians and civilian objects has the primary responsibility for the protection of 
civilians and civilian objects. The party controlling the civilian population generally has the 
greater opportunity to minimize risk to civilians.’ 
Douglas H. Fischer, Human Shields, Homicides, and House Fires: How a Domestic Law Anal-
ogy Can Guide International Law Regarding Human Shield Tactics in Armed Conflict, 57 AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 479, 489 (2007) (“In modern warfare, the effect of a defending 
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feasible civilian risk mitigation measures, the best efforts of the attacking 
force to mitigate the risk to civilians likely will be degraded, at times substan-
tially. 
It is therefore unsurprising why exploitation of civilians to shield military 
objectives was included as a war crime within the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.25 Nonetheless, this other side of the proverbial dis-
tinction coin has been ineffective in preventing the practice of using civilians 
as human shields in an attempt to impede an opponent’s military opera-
tions.26 In short, even the best efforts to protect civilians by implementation 
of feasible precautions by an attacking force will often be negated by the 
defending force’s failure to share an equal commitment to civilian risk miti-
gation with the unfortunate result being legally permissible civilian casual-
ties.27 
One possible reason why the prohibition against human shielding has 
failed to produce its intended impact is that those who violate this prohibi-
tion may be motivated by something far more pernicious than a desire to 
shield a military objective from attack: an effort to force the attacking oppo-
nent into inflicting civilian casualties. Such a motive may at first seem odd, 
but it seems increasingly plausible when the strategic information aspect of 
contemporary military operations is factored into the equation. In this con-
text, it is unsurprising that some non-State armed groups may act based on 
the expectation that the international community will instinctively condemn 
the attacking force for inflicting incidental death and injury of civilians and 
destruction to civilian property resulting from an attack reasonably assessed 
as lawful. Such condemnation is based on the understandable yet legally 
flawed assumption that the party that directly caused the harm bears legal 
responsibility for that harm.28 
                                                                                                                      
party’s failure to live up to its duties to separate civilian and military parties is that an attack-
ing party cannot avoid certain civilian casualties that it otherwise would have been able to 
prevent.”). 
25. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) (“Utilizing the presence of a civilian or 
other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from mili-
tary operations”). 
26. Blank, supra note 21, at 800 (“Given the widespread use of human shields, signifi-
cantly greater efforts are needed to prosecute perpetrators of this serious war crime.”). 
27. Fischer, supra note 24, at 489. 
28. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 297 
Images of dead and injured civilians transmitted across a globalized media can make it ap-
pear as if the attacker has mounted inhuman operations. In such an environment, even a 
tactically sound engagement causing casualties risks strategic fallout. This consequence typ-
ically constitutes the principle objective of the party employing shields; it seeks to weaken 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
Although it is understandable that images of civilian casualties and the 
destruction of civilian property commonly produce such an instinctive at-
tribution of legal and moral responsibility,29 credible attribution of such re-
sponsibility is far more complicated than this “effects-based” approach.30 
Nevertheless, illicit actors in armed conflict arguably seek to use the effects 
of combat to achieve their strategic goal of delegitimizing their opponents, 
even when their opponents comply with the law.31 
This phenomenon produces perverse effects.32 First, it focuses the spot-
light of condemnation on the law-compliant party by exploiting widespread 
lack of understanding regarding legally permissible civilian casualties.33 Sec-
ond, it incentivizes tactics that exacerbate rather than mitigate risk to civilians 
                                                                                                                      
support for the enemy’s war effort on the part of the international community, other states, 
non-governmental organizations and individuals, while enhancing its own domestic and in-
ternational backing. 
Corn, supra note 21, at 158 
Embedding firing positions, command posts, and logistics in and around such sites when 
other buildings and areas in close proximity could have been used suggests illicit tactical 
decision-making in violation of the passive precaution obligation. In these circumstances, it 
is completely logical to infer that these tactics were motivated by the hope that the IDF 
would refrain from or hesitate to attack such targets, and the understanding that if attacks 
were launched, the inevitable damage and destruction to these sites could be leveraged for 
strategic information value. 
29. Corn, supra note 21, at 168 (“It may be inevitable that LOAC-compliant armed 
forces will be compelled to contend with this disparity, as the tendency of the international 
community to engage in ‘effects based’ judgments of combat operations often nullifies the 
relevance of credible legal explanations for civilian casualties.”); see also Schmitt, supra note 
20, at 297. 
30. Eric Talbot Jensen & Ronald T.P. Alcala, The Impact of Emerging Technologies on the 
Law of Armed Conflict, in THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES ON THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 37 (Eric Talbot Jensen & Ronald T.P. Alcala eds., 2019) 
[T]his type of approach minimizes deliberate strategies to violate the LOAC, unfortunately 
all too common in today’s conflicts, either because the intentional violation of the LOAC 
is masked by the lack of actual civilian deaths or injury, or because the focus on effects 
trains all attention on the attack itself and not the conduct of the defending party in using 
human shields, co-mingling fighters with civilians, or locating military objectives in densely 
populated civilian areas. 
31. Corn, supra note 21, at 167–68; Schmitt, supra note 20, at 297. 
32. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 319 (“Further, the technology fielded by asymmetrically 
advantaged military forces has increasingly rendered defensive systems ineffective, the 
‘CNN effect’ generated by images of civilian casualties has enhanced the effectiveness of 
shields in precluding attack, particularly given adoption of lawfare strategies by weaker par-
ties.”); Corn, supra note 21, at 153–54. 
33. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 319; Corn, supra note 21, at 168. 
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by the defending force.34 These perverse effects should be countered by in-
creasing public awareness of the defending force’s unlawful conduct. Such a 
response would contribute to a more credible allocation of legal and moral 
responsibility for civilian suffering.35 In addition, this approach would am-
plify the reputational costs for exploiting the presence of civilians in armed 
conflict, thus delegitimizing these tactics, while at the same time offsetting 
the erosion of public confidence in armed forces that do their best to avoid 
such harm. 
Prosecuting those responsible for the use of human shields certainly con-
tributes to this effort.36 However, it is not the only—or necessarily the best—
approach to aligning legal responsibility and moral accountability with oper-
ational reality.37 Accordingly, this article proposes the recognition and em-
phasis of a complementary approach. Specifically, it proposes that intention-
ally baiting an attacking force into directly causing civilian casualties should 
be condemned not only as a human shielding violation, but also as an indirect 
attack on civilians. 
While it will concededly often be difficult to establish a baiting motive, 
more attention should be devoted to identifying what types of facts and cir-
cumstances reasonably support such a determination. If such a motive is 
reasonably established, characterizing the LOAC violation as human shield-
ing not only misses the point, it dilutes the true extent of legal and moral 
invalidity. In such instances, where the civilians are exploited not in the hope 
of averting an attack but instead in the hope the attack will be executed, the 
defending force is in essence utilizing a lawful attack by its opponent to inflict 
                                                                                                                      
34. Amnon Rubinstein & Yaniv Roznai, Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The 
Need for a Proportionate Proportionality, 22 STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 93, 109 (2011) 
(“The current rules governing the use of human shields and their practical application serve 
to benefit those parties willing to utilize civilian deaths to achieve military advantages.”); 
Corn, supra note 21, at 153 (“[F]ailing to require passive distinction by all belligerents incen-
tivizes tactics that exacerbate—rather than mitigate—civilian risk.”). 
35. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 109 (“Inquiries must also be scrupulously 
conducted as to whether the shielding party took appropriate safety measures to protect its 
civilians or, alternatively, whether it violated IHL by intentionally intermingling military ob-
jectives among civilians and relying on their presence in order to immunize its objectives 
from attacks.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 185 (“It has traditionally been perceived that, 
should civilian casualties ensue from an illegal attempt to shield combatants or a military 
objective, the ultimate responsibility lies with the Belligerent Party placing civilians at risk.”). 
36. Blank, supra note 21, at 800. 
37. Id. at 797. 
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civilian casualties.38 This is nothing short of a deliberate—albeit indirect—
attack on civilians and civilian property and should be condemned no differ-
ently than any other unlawful direct deliberate attack on civilians. 
This proposal draws heavily from the criminal law concept of innocent 
instrumentality. The doctrine of innocent instrumentality was developed to 
fill an accomplice liability dilemma that arose when the party directly causing 
harm acted lawfully. In these instances, even when another individual baited 
the principal into engaging in a harmful but lawful act, accomplice liability 
was nullified because the bad actor that baited the principal’s action did not 
contribute to the commission of an unlawful act, an essential requirement of 
accomplice liability. The innocent instrumentality doctrine evolved to ad-
dress this illogical immunity for an individual who, with a criminal mental 
state, instigates or baits an innocent actor into inflicting harm.39 Under this 
doctrine, when a party exploits the lawful act of a third party to produce an 
intended unlawful result, the actus reus of the principal, the individual directly 
causing the result, is attributed to the individual who instigated or baited the 
principal. Thus, when coupled with that individual’s criminal state of mind, 
the innocent agent’s act supports allocating direct criminal responsibility for 
the harm inflicted to the individual who exploited the principal as an inno-
cent agent. While characterized differently in different jurisdictions, this doc-
trine is used to hold individuals accountable for the use of innocent agents 
to cause intended unlawful harm. 
                                                                                                                      
38. The hypothetical used to highlight the importance of a more accurate characteriza-
tion and condemnation of civilian exploitation intended to produce injury to civilians or 
destruction of civilian property inflicted by an attacking force throughout this article pre-
supposes the legality of the attack. This is not, however, an essential requirement to justify 
this recharacterization and condemnation. There may be instances where both the defend-
ing and attacking force violate the law of armed conflict: the defending force by deliberately 
exploiting civilians in an effort to produce civilian casualties; the attacking force by launch-
ing the attack without implementing feasible civilian risk mitigation precautions or in viola-
tion of the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks (proportionality). Such an attack would 
in no way absolve the defending force from the unlawful civilian exploitation. Instead, con-
demnation for both parties to the conflict would be justified. Nonetheless, the emphasis on 
the lawful attack decision by the attacking force is intended to emphasize both the impera-
tive of ensuring such legality by any commander entrusted with these difficult legal and 
moral decisions. 
39. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 702 (5th ed. 2010) 
One who uses an intermediary to commit a crime is not ordinarily a principal in the first 
degree. It is otherwise, however, when the crime is accomplished by the use of an innocent 
or irresponsible agent, as where the defendant causes a child or mentally incompetent or 
one without a criminal state of mind to engage in conduct. 
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I believe it is time to consider extending the rationale underlying this 
doctrine to the assessment of responsibility for civilian casualties (human 
and material) resulting from attacks during armed conflict. Doing so will bet-
ter isolate and illuminate the unlawful tactics of the defending forces and the 
lawful conduct of the attacking forces. While it may be challenging to identify 
the demarcation point between human shielding and indirect attacks on ci-
vilians, this should not prevent the inquiry. The initial move should be a 
recognition of the illogic of assuming every exploitation of the presence of 
civilians is motivated by the same objective. In light of the undeniable impact 
on strategic legitimacy resulting from political, diplomatic, and public reac-
tion to civilian casualties, this assumption is strategically naïve. This first step 
of recognizing the notion of deliberate but indirect civilian targeting will then 
lead to the second step of exploring how to identify the line between these 
two variants of unlawful civilian exploitation. 
While it will be difficult to identify this line, there will be instances where 
the totality of information available enables this identification. Factors could 
include patterns of tactical activities implicating civilian risk creation, or, in 
contrast, risk mitigation. When this act supports only one rational inference 
(not merely the exploitation of civilians to obtain a shielding effect, but in-
stead an effort to actually cause civilian casualties inflicted by an opponent’s 
attack to be exploited in the information domain), the defending force is, in 
effect, using the attacking force as its “innocent agent” to attack civilians.40 
                                                                                                                      
40. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98 (“Some experts have further claimed that 
the party utilizing civilians as human shields should bear exclusive responsibility for conse-
quent civilian casualties because that party is responsible for creating the danger to those 
civilians.”); Louis Rene Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 14 
ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 141, 147–48 (1997) 
It also constitutes perfidy to shield military targets from attack by placing or moving them 
into densely populated areas, or by purposely moving civilians near military targets. Indeed, 
it is generally agreed that such treachery represents an especially serious violation of the 
Laws of War. . . . The recent harms to civilian refugees in Lebanon caused by Israeli shelling 
are tragic and regrettable, but the legal responsibility for the tragedy lies with those whose 
perfidious conduct brought about such shelling. 
Fischer, supra note 24, at 500–01 (“[P]lacing civilians in harm’s way is the basis for 
culpability in a human shield scenario where the military response is justified and is not 
unnecessarily destructive.”); Barry A. Feinstein, Proportionality and War Crimes in Gaza Under 
the Laws of Armed Conflict, 36 RUTGERS LAW RECORD 224, 246 (2009) 
Furthermore, if the civilian ramifications of the attack were the result of something not 
under the control of the attackers, the attack would not be deemed to have been indiscrim-
inate or disproportionate. For instance, Israel would not be responsible for casualties oc-
curring in those attack situations in which the terrorists, using civilians as human shields 
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Indeed, it seems increasingly common that this is the intended outcome 
when vital military assets are located in the midst of civilians with no appar-
ent tactical justification, especially when a party to a conflict encourages or 
even compels civilians to move to such locations when expecting an attack.41 
What complicates this assessment is the undisputed fact that an attacking 
force is not per se prohibited from launching an attack with the knowledge 
it will produce civilian casualties in and proximate to the intended target. As 
long as the attacking force complies in good faith with its civilian risk miti-
gation obligation—meaning that it has made a reasonable assessment of at-
tack legality after implementing its distinction, precautions, and proportion-
ality obligations—the attack is lawful, notwithstanding the incidental death 
and injury inflicted on civilians and the collateral damage to and destruction 
of civilian property.42 Accordingly, the attacking force is analogous to the 
innocent agent who engages in an act of self-defense in response to facts and 
circumstances orchestrated by a third party to cause a result that, while jus-
tified from the perspective of the direct actor, is unlawful from the perspec-
tive of the instigator. By attributing responsibility for the attack to the de-
fender, the exploitation of civilians or their property takes on an even more 
pernicious character: a deliberate attack on civilians. 
                                                                                                                      
and unknown to the IDF, forced innocent civilians either to remain in or come to the vi-
cinity of the military objective to be attacked following advance warnings given by Israel to 
evacuate the area. 
41. Corn, supra note 21, at 158. 
42. Id. at 160 
There are, of course, situations where the commander will ‘know’ with substantial certainty 
that an attack will produce incidental injury to civilians or collateral damage to civilian prop-
erty, and will nonetheless authorize the attack. So long as those attack judgments comply 
with the precautions and proportionality obligations, they are legally permissible. 
see also Schmitt, supra note 20, at 323 
[C]ertain principles, mentioned earlier, apply directly to strikes involving human shields. 
Most importantly, the target must qualify as a military objective, a term that includes com-
batants and civilians directly participating in hostilities. Even if it does, the planned attack 
must comport with the principle of proportionality . . . . Lastly, an attacker complying with 
that principle must nevertheless also take feasible precautions in attack. 
Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 UNIVER-
SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 675 (2012) 
The principle of distinction mandates that all parties to a conflict distinguish between those 
who are fighting and those who are not, and direct attacks only at the former. The principle 
of proportionality seeks to minimize incidental casualties during war and operationalizes 
LOAC’s fundamental premise that the means and methods of attacking the enemy are not 
unlimited. Thus, a commander must refrain from any attack in which the expected civilian 
casualties will be excessive in light of the anticipated military advantage gained. 
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To continue this discussion and address this issue, the remainder of the 
article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of cardinal 
LOAC principles intended to mitigate risk to civilians during the conduct of 
hostilities. These principles define LOAC compliance and the legality of an 
attacking force confronted with the unfortunate possibility of knowingly in-
flicting civilian casualties.43 Part III then reviews the “legitimacy” dilemma 
resulting from the combination of civilian exploitation and the tendency to 
engage in effects-based condemnations when attacks produce civilian casu-
alties. Part III also explains the innocent instrumentality doctrine in greater 
detail. Part IV builds on this analysis and explains how this doctrine could 
be incorporated into accountability and compliance assessments when at-
tacks conducted in good faith and compliant with LOAC targeting rules 
nonetheless produce civilian casualties. 
 
II. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE “BASIC RULE” 
 
The LOAC seeks to mitigate the suffering that war causes by imposing a 
wide array of limits on permissible belligerent conduct.44 In the context of 
the conduct of hostilities—or engaging in combat—regulation is premised 
                                                                                                                      
43. Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 79, 127 (2013) (noting that “mere knowledge of the risk to nearby ci-
vilians is insufficient to establish a violation of the principle of distinction”). 
44. See, e.g., AP I, supra note 6, art. 35(1) (“In any armed conflict, the right of the parties 
to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”); SASSÒLI, supra 
note 3, at 30, ¶ 3.38 (“IHL prohibits the use of means and methods of warfare that are of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”); HANS-PETER GASSER, IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (1993) (“International human-
itarian law seeks to mitigate the effects of war, first in that it limits the choice of means and 
methods of conducting military operations, and secondly in that it obliges the belligerents 
to spare persons who do not or no longer participate in hostile actions.”); DOD LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 15–16, § 1.3.4 (“The main purposes of the law of war are: 
protecting combatants, noncombatants, and civilians from unnecessary suffering.”); COM-
MANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 11, at 1-8, ¶ 1-28 
Humanity is the LOAC principle that forbids inflicting suffering, injury, or destruction un-
necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose. Humanity is sometimes referred to 
as the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering or the principle of avoiding superfluous 
injury. Commanders should exercise leadership to ensure that Soldiers and Marines under 
their command know that cruelty and the infliction of unnecessary suffering will not be 
tolerated. 
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on a simple but vitally important legal premise: the only legitimate objective 
in war is to weaken the enemy.45 
This premise is reflected in the foundational sources for the modern 
LOAC and has been reemphasized over several decades.46 For example, Ar-
ticle 15 of the Lieber Code—issued to the Union armed forces during the 
American Civil War—defines military necessity as follows: 
 
Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed 
enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoida-
ble in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every 
armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, 
or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, 
and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communica-
tion, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; 
of the appropriation of whatever an enemy’s country affords necessary for 
the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not 
involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding 
agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of 
war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do 
not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another 
and to God.47 
 
The 2016 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual is more 
succinct, and defines military necessity simply as, “the principle that justifies 
the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently 
as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”48 
                                                                                                                      
45. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles 
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, 18 MARTENS 
NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 1) 474 (“That the only legitimate object which States should en-
deavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”); SASSÒLI, 
supra note 3, at 2, ¶ 1.03 (“[IHL’s] substantive rules try to limit the use of violence in armed 
conflicts by . . . restricting the level of violence to the amount necessary to achieve the only 
legitimate aim of the conflict, which is to weaken the military potential of the enemy.”). 
46. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 16, at 685, ¶ 2218 (“A 
military advantage can only consist in ground gained and in annihilating or weakening the 
enemy armed forces.”). 
47. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field art. 15, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter Lieber Code]. 
48. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 53, § 2.2. 
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Both definitions reinforce the premise that attacks must only be directed 
at persons, places, or things that qualify as lawful targets.49 In some cases, 
identifying such targets will be relatively easy, for example, enemy military 
personnel, equipment, and facilities.50 In other cases, identifying who and 
what qualifies as a lawful object of attack will be far more far more challeng-
ing.51 No matter how complicated this assessment may be it is axiomatic that 
civilians and civilian property may not be made the deliberate objects of at-
tack.52 For civilians, this protection applies at all times, with the limited ex-
ception of civilians that directly participate in hostilities, and even then, these 
civilians lose their protection only for such time they directly participate in 
hostilities.53 
Accordingly, the LOAC establishes a binary principle of attack legality. 
Military objectives, including individuals who are not protected from delib-
erate attack, are presumptively hostile and may be attacked unless and until 
they no longer qualify as such.54 Civilians and civilian property are presump-
tively non-hostile and may not be attacked unless and for such time as they 
                                                                                                                      
49. See Lieber Code, supra note 47; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 63, § 
2.5.2; AP I, supra note 6, art. 48 (“In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military ob-
jectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.”). 
50. See, e.g., John J. Merriam & Michael N. Schmitt, Israeli Targeting: A Legal Appraisal, 
68 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 15, 20 (2015). 
51. Id. (“Simple though it may appear, applying the definition [of military objective in 
AP I] in practice can prove challenging.”). 
52. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, r. 1, at 3–8; 
DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 188–89, § 5.2.2 (“In general, military opera-
tions must not be directed against enemy civilians. In particular: Civilians must not be made 
the object of attack . . . .”). 
53. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 127, § 4.8.2 (“Civilians may not be 
made the object of attack, unless they take direct part in hostilities.”); DINSTEIN, supra note 
1, at 105 (“If civilians directly participate in hostilities, they lose their protection and become 
lawful targets of attack for such time as they do so.”). 
54. AP I, supra note 6, art. 52(2); see Geoffrey S. Corn et al., Belligerent Targeting and the 
Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 536, 550 (2013) 
(“Accordingly, the LOAC permits attack, or deliberate targeting of individuals, based not 
on a manifestation of actual threat, but instead based on the presumptive threat derived 
from the determination of enemy belligerent status.”); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 110 
(“The nature of a military objective is determined by its intrinsic character . . . an object 
must be endowed with some inherent attribute which eo ipso makes an effective contribution 
to military action. As such, the object automatically constitutes a lawful target for attack in 
wartime.”); Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 100 (“It should be clear, however, that 
when protected objects are used for military functions by a party to an armed conflict those 
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forfeit protection by actions or use.55 AP I codified this binary legal frame-
work, and marked the first contemporary LOAC treaty to include compre-
hensive rules for mitigating risk to civilians and civilian property during the 
conduct of hostilities. Perhaps most importantly, Articles 48, the “Basic 
Rule,” states, “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian 
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times 
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between ci-
vilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their oper-
ations only against military objectives.”56 
Respect for this basic rule is only one aspect of protecting civilians from 
the dangers of armed conflict. Because civilians will often be placed at risk 
of injury or death as the result of attacks on lawful military objectives, the 
LOAC imposes obligations on armed forces to minimize the harmful inci-
dental consequences of attacking a lawful objective.57 These include the ob-
ligation to take all feasible precautions to mitigate risk to civilians and civilian 
property,58 and the prohibition against launching indiscriminate attacks on 
otherwise lawful military objectives.59 
                                                                                                                      
objects become legitimate military targets.”). 
55. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(3); see COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND 
WARFARE, supra note 11, at 2-5, ¶ 2-22 (“LOAC authorizes combatants to make military 
objectives the object of an attack, but prohibits directing an attack against civilians not taking 
a direct part in hostilities, the civilian population as such, civilian objects, or other protected 
persons or objects.”); SASSÒLI, supra note 3, at 219, ¶ 7.38 (“Civilians may not be targeted 
(which may be regarded as including the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks) except if and 
for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.”). 
56. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(3). 
57. See especially id. art. 57. 
58. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(ii) (“[T]hose who plan or decide upon an attack shall . . . take all 
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, 
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage 
to civilian objects.”); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 250–52, § 5.11 (“Com-
batants must take feasible precautions in conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to 
civilians and other protected persons and objects.”); Michael N. Schmitt & Eric Widmar, 
‘On Target’: Precision and Balance in the Contemporary Law of Targeting, 7 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND POLICY 379, 400 (2014) (“[A] general obligation, known as the requirement 
to take precautions in attack, is operationalized in a number of specific rules.”); see also COM-
MANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 11, at 1-11, ¶ 1-44. 
59. Geoffrey S. Corn, War, Law, and the Oft Overlooked Value of Process as a Precautionary 
Measure, 42 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 419, 420 (2015) (“Central to the regulation of hos-
tilities are the core LOAC principles of distinction and discrimination. . . . Discrimination 
imposes an additional obligation to forego engaging in such an attack whenever the inci-
dental and collateral effects will be indiscriminate, and thereby unjustifiably endanger the 
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The precautions obligation has been the focus of increased attention 
over the past decade—and for good reason.60 Encouraging commanders to 
implement feasible measures that reduce risk to civilians without degrading 
the tactical benefit of conducting an attack aligns not only with the humani-
tarian objectives of the law, but also with military operational considera-
tions.61 Indeed, why would a commander forego the opportunity to spare 
civilians the deadly or destructive effects of an attack when doing so will in 
no way compromise tactical advantage? Importantly, the obligation applies 
not only to a commander launching an attack, but also to decisions related 
to the placement of military assets.62 Article 58 of AP I obligates all parties 
                                                                                                                      
civilian population.”); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 146 (“Attacks against civilians/ci-
vilian objects are banned not only when they are direct and deliberate, but also when they 
are indiscriminate.”); Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 58, at 406 (“IHL also imposes a number 
of restrictions on specific tactics. The two most significant are based on the broad prohibi-
tion on indiscriminate attacks.”). 
60. See Eric Talbot Jensen, Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks in Urban Areas, 98 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 147, 163 (2016) (noting that in 2003 the ICRC 
“identified the requirements of the defender to protect the civilian populations as one of 
the areas that needed greater emphasis” and concluding that “[t]he corresponding increase 
in urban conflict, ha[s] only intensified this need.”). 
61. Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the LOAC 
through an Operational Lens, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 337, 352 (2012) 
The commander and planners seek to mitigate the risk of collateral damage by selecting 
weapons and tactics that will, to the greatest feasible extent, produce the desired effect while 
limiting such collateral damage. This selection process is thoroughly consistent with the 
LOAC, and, of equal importance, it is also consistent with operational logic. Commanders 
gain no benefit from wasting effects, and they therefore logically seek to maximize effects 
on the intended objects of attack. 
id. at 369 
It is not uncommon in contemporary operations for commanders to refrain from launching 
lawful attacks based on policy-driven concerns (it simply might not be worth the cost of 
having to defend the legality of the attack in the public realm, or a commander may not 
want to alienate the civilian population by causing casualties that, while lawful, would still 
be perceived as unjustified). 
see also Corn, supra note 59, at 436 (“Preceding proportionality analysis with this initial 
step mitigates the risk of harm to civilians and civilian property. This aspect of the targeting 
process not only advances the LOAC’s humanitarian objectives, but it is also consistent 
with operational logic.”); Jensen & Alcala, supra note 30, at 34 
The principles highlight the goal of a balance between military needs and humanitarian con-
cerns that minimizes civilian harm as much as possible, and the methodology provides guid-
ance on how to achieve that goal by gathering and analyzing information about both the 
military value of a target and the consequences to the civilian population and civilian objects 
in the area and making choices among various operational alternatives to achieve the mis-
sion while minimizing harm to civilians. 
62. AP I, supra note 6, art. 58. 
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to an armed conflict to endeavor to avoid locating military assets in a manner 
that unnecessarily exposes civilians to the incidental consequence of an at-
tack on those assets.63 While this “passive” precautions obligation is substan-
tially qualified by feasibility considerations,64 it nonetheless reflects the over-
all LOAC objective of ensuring commanders take “constant care” to miti-
gate civilian risk.65 
The LOAC also prohibits indiscriminate attacks—even against lawful 
targets.66 This prohibition is codified in Article 51 of AP I, and is based on 
the recognition that the effects of an otherwise lawful attack, or the manner 
in which the attack is conducted, can be so dangerous to civilians that even 
when the attack is not directed against them it should nonetheless be pro-
hibited.67 Accordingly, Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate attacks and 
states that indiscriminate attacks are: 
 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be 
directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each 
such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian 
objects without distinction.68 
 
Article 51(5) continues by stating that specific types of attacks “are to be 
considered as indiscriminate,” namely, 
 
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a 
single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military 
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar 
concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and 
                                                                                                                      
63. Id. 
64. Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 58, at 400 (“IHL only requires the taking of precau-
tions that are feasible.”). 
65. AP I, supra note 6, art. 57(1); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 195, § 
5.2.3.5 (“Parties to AP I have agreed that ‘[i]n the conduct of military operations, constant 
care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.’”); COM-
MANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 11, at 5-5, ¶ 5-30 (“In 
the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian popula-
tion, civilians, and civilian objects.”). 
66. DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 146; Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 58, at 406. 
67. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(4)–(5). 
68. Id. art. 51(4)(a)–(c). 
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(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.69 
 
When hostilities between belligerent groups are conducted in locations 
with a very limited presence of civilians, compliance with these rules is rela-
tively easy.70 Such situations are unfortunately rare today.71 Instead, it has 
become the norm that hostilities occur in areas with a large presence of ci-
vilians and civilian property, which is one reason why the ratio of military to 
civilian casualties has increased exponentially over the past decades.72 Some 
military experts expect this trend to increase, with armed conflict in “mega 
cities” an anticipated likelihood in the future.73 
Complying with LOAC targeting rules is far more complex, and thus far 
more challenging, when military personnel and military assets are inter-
spersed within the civilian population.74 Moreover, a party to the conflict 
exacerbates this challenge by operating in a way that renders its personnel 
indistinguishable from civilians, such as by not wearing uniforms or carrying 
                                                                                                                      
69. Id. art. 51(5)(a)–(b). 
70. Blank, supra note 21, at 774 (“In traditional conflicts, one could distinguish between 
soldiers – who wore uniforms – and civilians – who typically did not venture near the bat-
tlefield – in most circumstances. Similarly, identifying military and civilian objects was usu-
ally feasible.”). 
71. Id. (“Contemporary conflicts introduce a whole new set of challenges in this area, 
however, demanding ever greater efforts—through intelligence-gathering and surveil-
lance—to determine who is who in the zone of combat operations.”). 
72. Id. (“It is precisely because of the lack of boundaries between conflict areas and 
civilian areas . . . that today’s conflicts pose particular challenges for distinction.”). 
73. David Shunk, Mega Cities, Ungoverned Areas, and the Challenge of Army Urban Combat 
Operations in 2030-2040, SMALL WARS JOURNAL, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/ 
mega-cities-ungoverned-areas-and-the-challenge-of-army-urban-combat-operations-in-
2030-2040 (“Mega cities will complicate and greatly challenge Army urban combat missions 
in the 2030–2040 timeframe.”); Patrick N. Kaune, Analysis of U.S. Army Preparation for Meg-
acity Operations 16 (Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, U.S. Army War Col-
lege, Civilian Research Project, 2016) (“Reliance on current technology within the megacity 
presents a challenge “since dense urban infrastructures make it difficult for US forces to 
fully employ long-range sensors and munitions. Moreover, civilian populations are an ever-
present reminder of the need to avoid collateral damage.”). 
74. Blank, supra note 21, at 776 (“In all of these situations, the great fluidity between 
hostile persons and innocent civilians and the conscious blending of hostile persons into 
the civilian population makes the task of identifying legitimate targets nearly impossible.”). 
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arms openly.75 Still, the law demands that commanders and their subordi-
nates take all good faith efforts to comply with these obligations, no matter 
how complex or challenging target identification and selection may be.76 
A different type of complexity arises where an enemy deliberately ex-
ploits the presence of civilians to shield assets from attack.77 As discussed 
previously, this tactic is commonly characterized as “human shielding” or 
the use of “human shields.” The U.S. DoD Law of War Manual emphasizes 
the complexity that this tactic introduces to military operations, stating, 
 
Adversary use of human shields can present complex moral, ethical, legal, 
and policy considerations. Use of civilians as human shields violates the 
rule that protected persons may not be used to shield, favor, or impede 
military operations. The party that employs human shields in an attempt to 
shield military objectives from attack assumes responsibility for their injury, 
although the attacker may share this responsibility if it fails to take feasible 
precautions.78 
 
Of course, the use of human shields, or “human shielding,” is a blatant 
LOAC violation,79 and most egregious when it results in death or injury to 
the civilians.80 Nonetheless, it would be perverse to allow the attacking party 
to abandon its civilian risk mitigation obligation simply because an enemy is 
utilizing this unlawful tactic.81 This is reflected in Article 51(8) of AP I, which 
provides that “[a]ny violation of these prohibitions shall not release the Par-
ties to the conflict from their legal obligations with respect to the civilian 
                                                                                                                      
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 774 (“The legal obligation remains the same however, requiring parties to 
distinguish between an innocent civilian and an individual who, although dressed in civilian 
attire, may pose an immediate threat, and is therefore a legitimate target.”). 
77. See 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, r. 97, at 
337–40. 
78. U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 269–70, § 5.12.3.4. 
79. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 652 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) (noting that the Appeals Chamber 
stressed that the use of prisoners of war or civilian detainees as human shields constitutes a 
violation of the Geneva Conventions regardless of whether they were actually harmed or 
attacked). 
80. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 332 (“Indeed, populations and groups at risk are the very 
ones likely to be compelled into [human] shielding.”). 
81. See Blank, supra note 21, at 772 (“The obligation to target only military objectives is 
one means of implementing the age-old principle that the means and methods of warfare 
are not unlimited.”). 
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population and civilians, including the obligation to take the precautionary 
measures provided for in Article 57.”82 
The prohibition on the use of human shields is found in AP I Article 51, 
which states: 
 
The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civil-
ians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from mili-
tary operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to 
the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or 
individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield military operations.83 
 
As the Commentary on the Additional Protocols indicates, the rule already included 
certain protected persons, such as prisoners of war or the wounded and sick, 
in various provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.84 The ICRC custom-
ary law study concluded that the prohibition on the use of human shields is 
a rule of customary international law applicable to both international and 
non-international armed conflicts. More specifically, the commentary to 
Rule 97 states, 
 
The prohibition of using human shields is contained in numerous military 
manuals, many of which extend the prohibition to all civilians. Using hu-
man shields constitutes a criminal offence under the legislation of many 
States. This practice includes that of States not, or not at the time, party to 
Additional Protocol I or to the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
. . . 
 
With respect to non-international armed conflicts, Additional Protocol II 
does not explicitly mention the use of human shields, but such practice 
would be prohibited by the requirement that “the civilian population and 
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising 
                                                                                                                      
82. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(8); DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 184 (“Article 51(8) of AP I 
insists that a violation of the prohibition of shielding military objectives with civilians does 
not release a Belligerent Party from its legal obligations vis-à-vis the civilians.”). 
83. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(7). 
84. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 16, at 627, ¶ 1986 
This provision affords measures of protection to the whole of the civilian population and 
all civilians, thus extending to them measures which already exist for two categories of per-
sons: prisoners of war and civilians protected by the fourth Convention. In fact, according 
to Article 23 of the Third Convention, prisoners of war may not be used to render certain 
points or areas immune from military operations. 
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from military operations.” . . . In addition, deliberately using civilians to 
shield military operations is contrary to the principle of distinction and vi-
olates the obligation to take feasible precautions to separate civilians and 
military objectives . . . .85 
 
The practice of using civilians as human shields is so fundamentally in-
consistent with the most basic principles of the LOAC that there can be no 
credible dispute with the ICRC’s conclusion. Unfortunately, the universal 
recognition of the prohibition of this practice has not eliminated its use.86 
Several military manuals highlight examples of this unlawful practice,87 while 
scholars have shown that non-State organized armed groups routinely utilize 
this tactic to offset the military advantages of their opponents.88 
As noted above, the deliberate use of civilians to shield personnel, equip-
ment, or facilities from attack does not negate the attacking force’s obligation 
to mitigate civilian risk.89 It is, however, only logical that human shielding 
will undermine such efforts. It is thus unsurprising that the LOAC categori-
cally condemns the use of such tactics. 
                                                                                                                      
85. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, r. 97, at 337–
38. 
86. Merriam & Schmitt, supra note 50, at 24. 
The LOAC clearly forbids the use of human shields. This has not prevented many states 
and nonstate actors from regularly using them, since the tactic holds out the prospect of 
either discouraging an attack by the adversary or mischaracterizing its strike as an intentional 
attack on protected civilians or as one that violates either the rule of proportionality or the 
requirement to take precautions in attack. 
87. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 339–40. 
Most examples given in military manuals, or which have been the object of condemnations, 
have been cases where persons were actually taken to military objectives in order to shield 
those objectives from attacks. The military manuals of New Zealand and the United King-
dom give as examples the placing of persons in or next to ammunition trains. There were 
many condemnations of the threat by Iraq to round up and place prisoners of war and 
civilians in strategic sites and around military defence points. Other condemnations on the 
basis of this prohibition related to rounding up civilians and putting them in front of military 
units in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Liberia. 
88. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Michael Schauss, Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: 
Towards a Cognitive Framework, 10 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 148, 151 (2019) 
(“[O]rganized armed groups that are asymmetrically disadvantaged in terms of conventional 
warfare have grasped that failing to distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
complicates their enemy’s targeting, especially when that enemy is committed to compliance 
with the international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of distinction.”); see also Geoffrey S. 
Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information Component: A Fourth 
Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 436 (2012). 
89. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(8). 
 
 
 
Indirect Civilian Targeting Vol. 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
Condemning this practice advances the LOAC’s humanitarian objec-
tives,90 which has led to a recognition that the use of human shields qualifies 
as a war crime and provides the basis for individual criminal responsibility.91 
As the ICRC discussion on Rule 97 indicates, the use of civilians as human 
shields has been prosecuted as a war crime in ad hoc war crimes tribunals 
and is a war crime within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
as well as the criminal statutes of several States.92 
The U.S. DoD Law of War Manual also includes a rule prohibiting the 
taking of hostages, and indicates that this practice amounts to human shield-
ing, stating, “[t]his prohibition is understood to include a prohibition against 
threatening to harm detainees whose lives are valued by the adversary in or-
der to induce the adversary not to attack, but is also understood to include 
the prohibition against using hostages as human shields.”93 From an opera-
tional standpoint, the unlawful nature of this tactic is quite well understood94 
                                                                                                                      
90. Id. 
91. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii); Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 
102 (“[A] violation of the prohibition on human shielding constitutes a war crime and will 
lead to individual criminal responsibility.”). 
92. Practice Relating to Rule 97: Human Shields, IHL DATABASE: CUSTOMARY IHL, ICRC, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule97 (last visited (June 9, 
2020) 
In its review of the indictment in 1996, the ICTY Trial Chamber upheld the charges and 
stated that these acts could ‘be characterised as war crimes (taking UNPROFOR soldiers as 
hostages and using them as human shields)’. The Trial Chamber noted that civilians were 
used as human shields against other troops. 
The ICRC includes a multitude of examples of States recognizing this act as a war crime 
in military manuals, national legislation, and the caselaw of individual States. 
As discussed in note 90, the Rome Statute also recognizes this act as constituting a war 
crime in Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii). However, under the Rome Statute, jurisdiction for this crime 
arises only in the context of an international armed conflict. Thus, while the ICRC concludes 
that the use of human shields is a war crime in any armed conflict, for the ICC, the prose-
cution of this offense is limited to international armed conflicts. No analogous crime falls 
within ICC jurisdiction for non-international armed conflicts, but this apparent gap is some-
what ameliorated by the crime of taking hostages applicable in the context of non-interna-
tional armed conflicts, defined in Article 8(2)(c) of the Rome Statute. 
93. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 52, § 2.2. 
94. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 109 (“The current rules governing the use of 
human shields and their practical application serve to benefit those parties willing to utilize 
civilian deaths to achieve military advantages.”). 
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and almost certainly regarded as among the most pernicious LOAC viola-
tions.95 In addition to qualifying as a war crime, this tactic is simply incon-
sistent with the notions of honor and legitimacy that provide the founda-
tional pillars of the profession of arms. In short, the exploitation of innocent 
civilians to gain a tactical advantage is immoral. 
For purposes of human shielding, the offense turns on proof indicating 
an intentional exploitation of civilians to obtain a shielding benefit. Of 
course, in the context of hostilities in areas with dense civilian populations, 
this intent may not be easily established, as the very nature of urban armed 
conflicts will result in the co-mingling of military assets amongst the civilian 
population.96 However, where the evidence is sufficiently compelling, con-
demnation of this practice must be consistent and unqualified. 
It is important to note that the prohibition against human shielding is 
more conduct than result based, in that the essence of the violation is the 
shielding conduct even absent any resulting civilian harm. Thus, even when 
circumstances clearly support the conclusion that civilians are being deliber-
ately used as human shields, condemnation is based on that illicit act and not 
on resulting civilian harm or the lack thereof. In this sense, human shielding 
is, by its nature, a conduct violation. However, the exploitation of civilians 
resulting in civilian death or injury logically aggravates the human shielding 
violation, and is especially more pernicious in situations where the totality of 
the circumstances point to one rational inference: an intent to produce this 
result. A deliberate effort to produce the result of civilian casualties is simply 
not analogous to creating a risk of such casualties in an effort to avert an 
enemy attack. While both obviously unlawfully exploit the presence of civil-
ians and civilian property, the intended outcome of the shielding tactic is that 
harm is not inflicted (although this can never be guaranteed). In contrast, if 
civilians are exploited in the hopes that the opponent will nonetheless attack, 
the intended outcome is death or injury to civilians or destruction of civilian 
property. This, unlike the shielding motive, renders the exploitation func-
tionally indistinguishable from deliberately and directly attacking civilians or 
civilian property. 
                                                                                                                      
95. Id.; see also 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 10, r. 
97, at 337–40. 
96. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 94 (“The modern battlefield has moved from 
the front to populated urban environments, thereby dramatically increasing civilian involve-
ment in hostilities.”). 
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There is another negative consequence resulting from conflating human 
shielding with indirect civilian targeting: condemnation dilution. This is be-
cause the natural focal point of such condemnation typically gravitates to-
wards the harmful result. This focus on civilian casualties creates an inherent 
risk of distorting the assessment of actual legal responsibility for such casu-
alties. While several scholars have challenged this trend of “effects-based” 
condemnation by emphasizing the illogic of allowing effects to become the 
dispositive indicator of LOAC non-compliance,97 it is naïve to assume that 
this trend will abate. In practice, this unfortunate trend creates a potential 
attenuation between how commanders and legal advisors assess LOAC com-
pliance and how the broader public and international community does. For 
                                                                                                                      
97. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Humanitarian Regulation of Hostilities: The Decisive Element of 
Context, 51 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 763, 766 
Nothing could be more corrosive to the logic of reasonableness than the continued gravi-
tation towards ‘effects-based condemnations’ based primarily—if not exclusively—on the 
infliction of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property. Such an approach penal-
izes commanders whose good-faith efforts to implement civilian risk mitigation measures 
fail to produce the desired outcome; rewards commanders who disregard civilian protection 
legal obligations yet produce outcomes that fortunately do not manifest themselves in actual 
civilian harm; incentivizes enemy efforts to expose civilians to the risks of combat and 
thereby increase the probability that friendly civilian risk mitigation efforts will have mini-
mal effect; and undermines respect for the law by those entrusted with its implementation 
by creating an unrealistic ‘zero-civilian casualty’ expectation. 
GAZA CONFLICT TASK FORCE, JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY OF 
AMERICA, 2014 GAZA WAR ASSESSMENT: THE NEW FACE OF CONFLICT 46 (2015), 
http://jinsa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/2014GazaAssessmentReport.pdf (“Ef-
fects-based critiques distort this equation by relying on post hoc consequences as the sole 
indication of LOAC compliance. However, the legal standard for compliance turns on the 
reasonableness of the attack decision at the time it was made based on available infor-
mation.”); Laurie R. Blank, Assessing LOAC Compliance and Discourse as New Technologies 
Emerge: From Effects-Driven Analysis to “What Effects?”, in THE IMPACT OF EMERGING TECH-
NOLOGIES ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 30, at 36 (“The effects-driven 
approach . . . disregards the notion of targeting as a methodology and ignores these opera-
tional realities that are at the heart of and inform the targeting process and any careful anal-
ysis thereof.”); Eric Talbot Jensen, The Future of the Law of Armed Conflict: Ostriches, Butterflies, 
and Nanobots, 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 253, 259–60 (2014) (“Re-
cent examples of this phenomenon abound and many LOAC scholars argue that the current 
LOAC regime in fact encourages non-compliance and incentivizes fighters to use the LOAC 
as a shield to give them an advantage when fighting LOAC-compliant forces.”); Michael N. 
Schmitt, Precision Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 
THE RED CROSS 455, 457 (2005) 
The principle of proportionality is often misapplied. For instance, in some cases the mere 
quantum of collateral damage and incidental injury causes critics to condemn a strike as 
disproportionate. However, the extent of harm and damage is relevant only in relation to 
the military advantage reasonably expected as the attack was launched. 
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the commander, it is the ex-ante nature of the obligation to take constant care 
to mitigate civilian risk that must be the focal point of compliance.98 
Those good faith efforts will ideally produce outcomes that enhance the 
mitigation of civilian risk. But commanders also know that no matter how 
determined their civilian risk mitigation efforts may be, when an attack none-
theless results in civilian casualties, it will be that outcome and not their ex-
ante efforts that will be the focal point of criticism.99 And so does the enemy. 
Hence, the unfortunate reality is that even the best efforts to mitigate civilian 
risk by an attacking force cannot guarantee that outcome, a reality that is all 
the more obvious when an enemy seeks to produce the exact result the at-
tacking force is trying to mitigate and avoid.100 
A better result would be for the law to align the condemnation of civilian 
exploitation with the true nature of that exploitation. Doing so will help off-
set the tendency to engage in “effects-based” criticism of the party to the 
conflict that directly caused civilian casualties as the result of an attack, and 
redirect the criticism to the opponent that indirectly targeted civilians by us-
ing the attacking force as its “innocent agent.”101 
                                                                                                                      
98. See AP I, supra note 6, art. 57. 
99. Blank, supra note 42, at 9 
Rather than assess the lawfulness of an attack from the commander’s perspective at the 
time of the attack—as mandated by LOAC—this effects-based approach is driven primarily 
or entirely by the effects of the attack. Thus, the death of civilians or damage to civilian 
objects becomes the sole factor in claims of LOAC violations irrespective of the infor-
mation available to the commander at the time of the attack or the intervening factors that 
contribute to a result different from that anticipated at the time of the attack. 
Kilcup, supra note 19, at 257 (“Because of the unpredictable nature of conflict in real 
time, there are doubtless attacks that appear to be disproportionate ex post that were not 
disproportionate ex ante. Consequently, an ex post analysis would likely affect the legal out-
come in adjudications of the war crime of disproportionate force.”). 
100. Blank, supra note 97, at 12 
[T]he effects-driven approach enables and incentivizes the exploitation of the law by the 
defending party for its own defensive and propaganda purposes. If one party knows that 
any civilian deaths will produce claims of war crimes and the ensuing international condem-
nation, the defending party will simply position its forces and equipment in and around the 
civilian population, effectively guaranteeing greater civilian casualties and increased civilian 
suffering, the very opposite of the LOAC’s core goal—and the intent of those incorrectly 
relying on an effects-based analysis, in an unfortunate twist. 
see also Schmitt, supra note 97, at 464 (“Iraqi forces furthermore regularly used human 
shields and civilian objects . . . in order to deter precision attacks.”). 
101. Jensen & Alcala, supra note 30, at 43 (“On one level, the end of reliance on effects 
as a measure of law compliance will be welcome and will help to recalibrate the expert and 
public discourse on the LOAC to a more appropriate and nuanced space.”). 
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The tendency to conflate effects-based condemnations and a conduct-
based violation does not mean that the prohibition against the use of human 
shields has no significance. To the contrary, this prohibition plays an im-
portant role in credible assessments of responsibility for civilian casualties. 
However, it is equally clear that no matter how pernicious the conduct of 
using human shields may be, it is the civilian suffering that produces that is 
the most aggravated consequence. In other words, the use of human shields 
must be condemned even when the tactic does not result in civilian injuries 
or casualties. But, when injuries and especially casualties do result from the 
exploitation of civilians, a further question is warranted: what was the in-
tended use of these civilians? 
It is the exploiting of civilians to produce civilian casualties that can then 
be leveraged to discredit the attacking party that warrants a greater level of 
condemnation than human shielding provides. When civilian exploitation 
results in death or injury to civilians directly caused by an opponent’s attack, 
the responsibility must be carefully assessed. When it is the result of an effort 
to shield an object from attack, the human shield characterization is logical. 
However, when the information indicates that causing civilian casualties was 
the intended effect, the gravity of the LOAC should align with the nature of 
the condemnation. In such situations, condemnation should focus not only 
on the conduct offense of using human shields, but also on the intended 
result of that use: a deliberate attack on those civilians.102 And contrary to 
the assumption that responsibility for such deliberate attacks falls on the at-
tacking force; it is the party exploiting the civilians so that they are likely to be 
killed or injured that should be treated as responsible for the attack,103 hence, 
this article’s use of the term indirect civilian targeting (ICT). 
 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF INNOCENT INSTRUMENTALITY 
 
The characterization of an “indirect” attack may seem odd when applied to 
the unlawful exploitation of civilians that results in death or injury. After all, 
it is the party launching the attack that directly causes that death or injury. 
As noted earlier, however, the criminal law doctrine of innocent instrumen-
tality offers a useful approach for attributing the act of attack to the party 
unlawfully exploiting the presence of civilians.104 
                                                                                                                      
102. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98. 
103. Id. 
104. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
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This doctrine evolved in response to the difficulty associated with im-
posing criminal accountability on an individual who exploits an innocent 
agent to perform a harmful act.105 In such situations, even if another party 
with a criminal mental state aided and abetted the actor that caused the direct 
harm, the bad actor could raise the defense that the underlying act was law-
ful, thereby negating accomplice liability. Thus, neither the “instigator,” nor 
the “aider and abettor” could be found guilty as an accomplice because crim-
inal liability for accomplices derives from the criminal responsibility of the 
principal.106 And where the principal was not legally responsible for the al-
leged offense, the aider and abettor had not contributed to a crime.107 
For example, imagine an adult who uses a young child to commit a mur-
der. The adult might tell the child, “Take this toy gun, and go shoot 
mommy.” If the child shoots and kills the adult’s intended victim, the adult 
would seem legally responsible as an accomplice.108 However, the child—the 
ostensible principal—is not legally responsible for the killing because of the 
doctrine of infancy.109 This outcome creates an obstacle to convicting the 
adult as an accomplice, as there is no crime upon which to base derivative 
criminal liability.110 The innocent instrumentality doctrine overcomes this 
obstacle, as the instigator used the child as an “innocent instrumentality” to 
avoid directly engaging in the act that caused the unlawful result he or she 
sought to produce.111 
                                                                                                                      
105. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 883–84. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 729 
On these facts it was held that A could not be convicted of burglary. A was not the principal 
in the first degree, as he did not himself enter the premises, and thus he could be held for 
the burglary only as an accessory to B. B, however, did not commit a burglary, for he lacked 
the intent to permanently deprive C of the food. Thus, concluded the court, A could not 
be held as an accessory to B’s burglary, for B committed no burglary. 
108. Id. at 709 
Such terms as ‘advise,’ ‘command,’ ‘counsel,’ ‘encourage,’ ‘induce,’ and ‘procure’ suggest 
that one may become an accomplice without actually rendering physical aid to the endeavor. 
This is the case. One may become an accomplice by acting to induce another through 
threats or promises, by words or gestures of encouragement, or by providing others with 
the plan for the crime. 
109. Id. at 511–12 (“At common law, children under the age of seven are conclusively 
presumed to be without criminal capacity.”). 
110. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 
73 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 323, 369 (1985) (“Since the liability of the accomplice derives 
from that of the principal, the former cannot be held liable unless the latter has acted in 
violation of the law.”). 
111. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 702 
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Infancy and a lack of mental responsibility are not the only situations in 
which an actor may be treated as an innocent agent. A much more relevant 
situation arises when an individual with a criminal intent to produce harm 
exploits another individual’s act of lawful self-defense or defense of others 
to directly cause that intended harm.112 This practice has become common 
enough that the term “swatting” is now used to characterize it. Swatting in-
volves an individual who makes a false 911 emergency call that someone is 
in mortal danger in the home of an intended victim who is at that time play-
ing a violent video game.113 When police arrive and hear the sounds of weap-
ons in the home they may employ force based on a reasonable yet erroneous 
judgment of necessity. 
In such a situation, any resulting injury or death to the occupant will be 
legally justified by the reasonable judgment of self-defense necessity, and 
therefore the police who directly cause that injury or death have not com-
mitted a criminal act. As with the use of a child as an innocent agent, exploit-
ing a third party’s act in self-defense based on that party’s reasonable per-
ception of requisite necessity would result in a legally justified act of violence. 
Yet, the individual who baited the police into an encounter in order to ex-
ploit their lawful response to produce an intended unlawful result should not 
be permitted to avoid criminal responsibility because of the officer’s legal 
justification for using force. The innocent instrumentality doctrine attributes 
the officer’s direct action to the instigating individual, which, when coupled 
with the criminal mental state supports conviction. 
In the context of an attack during the conduct of hostilities, the notion 
of “innocence” means the agent is engaged in conduct that is legally justified 
or excused, and therefore lawful.114 As a result, the encouragement of that 
                                                                                                                      
In such a case the intermediary is regarded as a mere instrument and the originating actor 
is the principal in the first degree. The principal is accountable for the acts or omissions of 
the innocent or irresponsible person, and the principal’s liability is determined on the basis 
of that conduct and the principal’s own mental state. 
112. See, e.g., Bailey v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 258, 329 S.E.2d 37 (1985) (noting that 
in this case, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the actions of his innocent instruments 
(the police) constituted justifiable homicide because the self-defensive nature of their ac-
tions meant that no crime occurred). 
113. Matt Stevens & Andrew R. Chow, Man Pleads Guilty to ‘Swatting’ Hoax That Resulted 
in a Fatal Shooting, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/11/13/us/barriss-swatting-wichita.html. 
114. Neve Gordon & Nicola Perugini, The Politics of Human Shielding: On the Resignification 
of Space and the Constitution of Civilians as Shields in Liberal Wars, 34 ENVIRONMENT AND PLAN-
NING D: SOCIETY AND SPACE 168, 172 (2016) (“While the term human shield does not 
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conduct could not support criminal responsibility based on principles of ac-
complice liability115 because such liability is contingent on the principal com-
mitting an unlawful act.116 
In a situation of innocent instrumentality, an individual seeks to produce 
an unlawful result by someone else’s hand. To do so, the individual uses 
another individual to produce that result. However, because the conduct di-
rectly responsible for that result is legally justified or excused, there is no 
unlawful act to support accomplice liability. Accordingly, the party that ex-
ploited the innocent agent would assert there is no basis for the imposition 
of accomplice liability. 
To address this situation, the common law treated the actus reus of the 
innocent agent as if it were committed by the party exploiting that agent.117 
When coupled with the criminal state of mind that actuated the exploitation 
of the innocent agent, this allowed the instigator to be treated not as an ac-
complice, but as the principal responsible for the criminal result.118  
The case of Bailey v. Commonwealth illustrates the application of this doc-
trine.119 This case arose from a police shooting that killed a homeowner in 
Virginia.120 The police had been dispatched to the home as the result of a 
911 call from the man who was ultimately convicted of the killing.121 That 
man and the victim had been long-time antagonists on Ham radio.122 The 
defendant knew the victim was legally blind and one evening told the victim 
that he was coming to his home to confront him.123 The victim responded 
he would be waiting on the front porch with a gun.124 
The defendant then placed a 911 call to report that a man at that address 
was on his porch threatening people with a gun.125 When the police arrived, 
                                                                                                                      
actually appear in the document, the Fourth Geneva Convention provides de jure protection 
to militaries that kill human shields.”). 
115. LAFAVE, supra note 39, at 883–84. 
116. Id. 
117. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2d ed. 2010) (“[A Principal in the First 
Degree] is the person who, with the requisite mens rea, personally commits the offense, or 
who uses an innocent human instrumentality to commit it.”). 
118. Id. 
119. Bailey v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 258, 329 S.E.2d 37 (1985). 
120. Id. at 259. 
121. Id. at 261. 
122. Id. at 260. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 261. 
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the victim was indeed on his porch.126 Unable to see sufficiently to recognize 
that it was the police, the defendant assumed it was his antagonist.127 He 
raised his firearm in a threatening manner, and in response, the police offic-
ers, acting in self-defense, fired on the man and killed him.128 
The defendant was convicted of murder for the killing.129 On appeal to 
the Virginia Supreme Court, he argued that the conviction was invalid be-
cause the police shooting was legally justified as an act of self-defense.130 Ac-
cording to the defendant, this meant that there was no unlawful killing to 
connect to him as an accomplice.131 The Virginia Supreme Court rejected his 
appeal, but not by treating him as an accomplice to the police shooting.132 
Instead, the Court concluded that the evidence established the defendant 
had used the police as his innocent instrumentality to produce the unlawful 
killing.133 As a result, the Court concluded that the action of the police officer 
that shot and killed the victim was properly attributed to the defendant as if 
he had committed that act.134 When coupled with his criminal mens rea, this 
established the crime of murder.135 
The Model Penal Code, a model criminal code developed by the Amer-
ican Law Institute to assist states to update and standardize their criminal 
statutes,136 adopts the approach.137 More than two-thirds of U.S. states have 
adopted the Model Penal Code, either in its entirety or in large part.138 Rec-
ognizing the invalidity of allowing a defendant like Bailey to avoid criminal 
responsibility when using an innocent agent to commit a crime, the Model 
                                                                                                                      
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 259. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 262. 
132. Id. at 265. 
133. Id. at 263. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS D. DUBBER, THE AMERICAN MODEL PENAL 
CODE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (2007). 
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Proposed Official 
Draft 1962). 
138. Model Penal Code, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/law/enc 
yclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/model-penal-code (last updated May 20, 2020) 
(noting that 36 U.S. states have adopted criminal codes influenced by the Model Penal 
Code). 
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Penal Code treats the use of an innocent instrumentality as a basis for ac-
complice liability.139 Specifically, Section 2.06(2)(a) provides that “a person is 
guilty of an offense that she [or he] did not personally commit if, acting with 
the requisite mens rea, she [or he] ‘causes an innocent or irresponsible person’ 
to commit the crime.”140 
Liability based on this doctrine is contingent on proof that the defendant 
not only used an innocent agent to engage in such conduct, but that he or 
she did so with the criminal mental state related to the offense charged. Thus, 
the doctrine does not ipso facto establish criminal liability, but instead is used 
to satisfy the actus reus element of such liability. For purposes of both con-
demnation and criminal accountability, this same rationale would provide a 
logical response to a party to a conflict that exploits civilians in an effort to 
bait the opponent into conducting an attack that may be lawful under the 
circumstances but will cause civilian casualties. In such circumstances, this 
approach would support characterizing this exploitation as an attack on ci-
vilians, albeit an indirect attack. 
Attacking civilians is not only a clear violation of the LOAC’s “basic 
rule” of distinction; it is also a war crime.141 As noted above, this is reflected 
in a variety of treaties and legal sources, including the offenses falling within 
the scope of the ICC’s jurisdiction.142 While the unlawful use of human 
shields or taking of hostages are also war crimes, when the totality of the 
information indicates civilians were deliberately exposed to the risk of an 
attack, that can and should be condemned not as human shielding, but as 
indirect civilian targeting.143 
Concededly, it will often be difficult to credibly assess the line between 
unlawful human shielding and deliberate indirect attack on civilians. Should 
this difficulty deter efforts to draw a distinction between these two variants 
of unlawful civilian exploitation and to identify each? No. Indeed, this effort 
is especially important considering what many States perceive as an increas-
ingly common tactic of non-State armed groups engaged in hostilities with 
State armed forces to generate civilian casualties in order to delegitimize their 
State opponents.144 Organized armed groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and 
ISIS understand the strategic value of forcing their opponents to conduct 
                                                                                                                      
139. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 137, § 2.06. 
140. Id. § 2.06(2)(a). 
141. DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 300. 
142. Id. 
143. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98. 
144. Schmitt & Schauss, supra note 88, at 151. 
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attacks in situations where civilian casualties are inevitable.145 These casual-
ties are then leveraged to undermine the legitimacy of their opponents’ mil-
itary efforts,146 reaping a two-prong reward. First, the attacking force will 
often change its attack plans to mitigate the extent of civilian casualties, giv-
ing the party using the unlawful tactic an unjustified military advantage.147 
Second, if the opponent launches an attack after assessing the risk to civilians 
consistent with LOAC obligations, the ensuing civilian casualties will be ex-
ploited as part of a strategic information campaign to delegitimize the State 
opponent.148 
This tactic should be characterized as an attack on civilians that exploits 
not only the presence of civilians, but the opponent’s conclusion that attack-
ing the shielded target is lawful even with full knowledge the attack will cause 
civilian casualties. Treating the shielding tactic as an attack on civilians pro-
duces a more logical alignment between the nature of the condemnation and 
the intended outcome of this unlawful tactic. 
But this also means that the use of civilians or other protected persons 
to shield forces, equipment, or facilities from enemy attack is not itself suf-
ficient to justify characterizing that tactic as a deliberate attack on civilians. 
Instead, that characterization will only be credible based on information that 
                                                                                                                      
145. See, e.g., Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98 (“In recent years, facing superior 
adversaries, terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah, Taliban, and Hamas, have also 
adopted the human shields tactic.”). 
146. Margaret T. Artz, A Chink in the Armor: How a Uniform Approach to Proportionality 
Analysis Can End the Use of Human Shields, 45 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 1447, 1483 (2012) (“Belligerents who use human shields have thus far skillfully reori-
ented the court of public opinion from their Article 51(7) [AP I] violation to the potential 
[Article] 51(8) violation of the attacking party.”). 
147. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 95 (“[T]he attacking party . . . might refrain 
from attacking due to moral or legal constraints regarding harm to civilians.”). 
148. GAZA CONFLICT TASK FORCE, supra note 97, at 8 (arguing that Hamas “deployed 
a well-orchestrated information campaign of distorted facts and legal principles to create a 
narrative of Israeli legal culpability for civilian casualties to undermine Israel’s international 
legitimacy”); GEMUNDER CENTER HYBRID WARFARE TASK FORCE, JEWISH INSTITUTE FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY OF AMERICA, ISRAEL’S NEXT NORTHERN WAR: OPERATIONAL AND 
LEGAL CHALLENGES 7 (2018), https://jinsa.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/10/Hybrid-
Warfare-TF-October-2018-Report.pdf 
Hezbollah will seek to portray Israel as an arbitrary, immoral, and illegal murderer of civil-
ians by illegally exposing Lebanese civilians to harm, manipulating the media narrative, and 
exploiting widespread misconceptions about the law of armed conflict (LOAC). By 
weaponizing information and the law, Hezbollah will hope to survive to fight another day 
while delegitimizing Israel in the eyes of the world before the IDF can achieve a decisive 
military victory. 
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establishes three essential findings. First, that the civilians or protected per-
sons were exploited to impede enemy attack. Second, that the tactic was mo-
tivated by an effort to bait the enemy force into launching an attack that 
would expose the shields to a substantial risk of death or injury. Third, that 
the attack was lawful under the circumstances. The following Part examines 
these essential findings more fully. 
 
IV. WHAT MAKES AN ATTACK “INNOCENT” FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE 
INNOCENT INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE? 
 
The innocent instrumentality doctrine is based on the assumption that the 
individual who engages in the conduct attributed to the defendant acted with 
lawful justification or lacked a criminal state of mind. In the context of an 
attack that results in civilian casualties, only the first category—a lawful jus-
tification—would indicate the “innocence” of the actual attack. 
This means that the attribution of the attack that causes civilian casualties 
to the party exploiting the presence of civilians necessitates a finding that the 
attack was not excessive when conducted. In this regard, it is important to 
note that such an assessment will often be credible even when the attacking 
party anticipates causing civilian casualties. It is true, as noted above, that the 
deliberate exposure of civilians to the effects of attack does not release the 
attacking party from its obligation to mitigate civilian risk.149 However, when 
the risk of such casualties is reasonably assessed as unavoidable without com-
pletely foregoing an attack, a proportionality assessment may conclude that 
these effects are not excessive in comparison to the anticipated concrete and 
direct military advantage, thereby rendering the attack lawful.150 Further-
more, the enemy’s deliberate use of civilians in such a manner will almost 
certainly influence this proportionality assessment. Indeed, the U.S. DoD 
Law of War Manual reflects this position, stating, “The party that employs 
human shields in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack assumes 
                                                                                                                      
149. AP 1, supra note 6, art. 51(8). 
150. Id. art. 51; see DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 157 (“The principle of proportionality 
does not bar the destruction of that military asset, notwithstanding the presence of civilians 
and the expectation of substantial casualties among them.”); SASSÒLI, supra note 3, at 366–
67, ¶ 8.332; see also Beth Van Schaack, The Law & Policy of Human Shielding, in COMPLEX 
BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WAR-
FARE 463 (Winston S. Williams & Christopher M. Ford eds., 2019). 
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responsibility for their injury, although the attacker may share this responsi-
bility if it fails to take feasible precautions.”151 Further, the citation support-
ing this provision states, “In no case may a combatant force utilize individual 
civilians or the civilian population to shield a military objective from attack. 
A nation that utilizes civilians to shield a target from attack assumes respon-
sibility for their injury, so long as an attacker exercises reasonable precaution 
in executing its operations.”152 
This provision was subject to significant criticism.153 However, it does 
reflect a pragmatic understanding of the operational impact of this unlawful 
tactic. Perhaps more importantly, by emphasizing the potential mutual re-
sponsibility for civilian casualties, the provision reinforces the logic of the 
innocent instrumentality doctrine. If good faith efforts are made to mitigate 
the risk to civilians or other protected persons being exploited by an enemy, 
the attack qualifies as lawful. As a result, while the attack will be the direct 
cause of civilian casualties and injuries, responsibility for those harms is at-
tributed to the party that indirectly targeted the civilians. 
Accordingly, in the context of conducting an attack, the concept of in-
nocence is best understood as lawfulness.154 And central to this aspect of the 
analysis is the basic construct of LOAC targeting law. As noted above, tar-
geting law categorically prohibits any deliberate attack on civilians or other 
protected persons, but it also permits the knowing infliction of death and 
injury as a related consequence of an attack directed against a lawful military 
                                                                                                                      
151. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 52, § 2.2. 
152. Id. at 285, § 5.16.5 and n.509. 
153. See, e.g., Adil Ahmad Haque, The Defense Department’s Indefensible Position on Killing 
Human Shields, JUST SECURITY (June 22, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/24077/ hu-
man-shields-law-war-manual/. 
154. See Corn, supra note 21, at 162 
There are, of course, situations where the commander will ‘know’ with substantial certainty 
that an attack will produce incidental injury to civilians or collateral damage to civilian prop-
erty, and will nonetheless authorize the attack. So long as those attack judgments comply 
with the precautions and proportionality obligations, they are legally permissible. 
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objective.155 In this sense, attacks do not violate the LOAC whenever a com-
mander anticipates the infliction of such casualties.156 Only when those an-
ticipated casualties are assessed as excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated from the attack does the law character-
ize the attack as unlawful.157 
The difference between purpose and knowledge of the anticipated inflic-
tion of death or injury to civilians or other protected persons is a vital de-
marcation between lawful and unlawful attacks.158 Such casualties should 
never be inadvertent or unexpected, as the law imposes on the commander 
the obligation to calculate the risk of such casualties as part of the propor-
tionality assessment.159 Thus, in the context of attack decision making, the 
                                                                                                                      
155. Shannon Bosch, Targeting Decisions Involving Voluntary Human Shields in International 
Armed Conflicts in Light of the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 46 COMPARATIVE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 447 (2013) (“Consequently, ‘in the 
case of human shields a sufficiently significant military advantage in relation to the danger 
to which human shields are exposed could render an attack on a military objective legitimate, 
despite their presence.’”). 
156. Id. 
157. AP I, supra note 6, art. 51(5)(b). 
158. Ohlin, supra note 43, at 82 
Simply put, black-letter international criminal law (ICL) establishes that intentionally direct-
ing an attack against civilians constitutes a war crime. . . . The problem here is the deep 
ambiguity over what is meant by the concept of intent. . . . This is precisely why, for instance, 
the U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC) abandoned the ambiguous language of intent in favor 
of the more precise categories of purpose and knowledge to express these differences. The 
more common phrases in civil law jurisdictions, dolus directus and dolus indirectus, cover the 
same conceptual territory as acting with purpose and acting with knowledge. 
see also id. at 104 
Acting with purpose (dolus directus) involves the highest form of volition, i.e., a desire to 
bring a particular state of affairs into being. Acting with knowledge (dolus indirectus) also 
involves a volitional component because the actor brings about a state of affairs that is 
practically certain to obtain, even though that state of affairs is not his or her purpose for 
acting. 
159. AP 1, supra note 6, art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (“Those who plan or decide upon an attack 
shall refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated.”); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 260, § 5.12 (“Combatants must 
refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage 
to civilian objects incidental to the attack would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage expected to be gained.”); see also SASSÒLI, supra note 3, at 31, ¶ 3.41 
IHL requires those planning and deciding on an attack to take additional precautionary 
measures, including taking all feasible measures to verify that the target of attack is a legiti-
mate target, taking all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare 
to avoid or minimize incidental civilian damage and refraining from initiating the attack if 
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knowledge that an attack will cause such casualties does not render the attack 
unlawful.160 Indeed, an unreasonable failure to assess such risk is itself a 
breach of the obligation to take all feasible precautions to identify the target 
and assess the risk to civilians and other protected persons.161 
When an opponent uses civilians to impede an attack or, even worse, to 
bait the opponent into an attack intended to cause civilian casualties, that 
tactic alone suggests that the shielded target qualifies as a lawful military ob-
jective. Furthermore, the use of civilians supports the inference that the en-
emy perceives the target as valuable and that its total or partial destruction 
will offer the attacking force a definite military advantage. This inference 
would normally explain why the enemy employs human shields. The only 
other explanation would be an effort to bait the attacking force into the mis-
taken conclusion that the object was a military objective when the enemy’s 
goal was simply to produce civilian casualties. 
In either case, as long as the attacking force (1) makes a reasonable as-
sessment that the object attacked is a military objective,162 (2) takes all feasi-
ble precautions to mitigate the risk to the civilians or other protected persons 
used as human shields,163 and (3) assesses the anticipated death or injury to 
                                                                                                                      
it is expected that incidental loss of civilian life or destruction of civilian objects will out-
weigh the military advantage anticipated from the attack. 
DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 158 (“The whole assessment of what injury or damages is 
‘excessive’ in the circumstances entails a mental process of weighing in the balance dissimilar 
considerations—to wit, the expected civilian losses/damage and the anticipated military ad-
vantage . . . .”); Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 100 (“[E]ven with regard to a lawful 
attack on a military objective, the principle of proportionality entails a duty on the military 
commander to assess the attack’s collateral damage (i.e., civilian casualties or damage to 
civilian objects), and to consider it against the anticipated military advantage.”). 
160. GREEN, supra note 17, at 155 (“Injury caused to civilians or civilian objects inci-
dental to a legitimate attack against a military objective does not render the attack illegal.”). 
161. Id. at 350 (“Attacks which fail to distinguish between military and civilian person-
nel or military objectives and civilian objects are forbidden as indiscriminate.”). 
162. AP 1, supra note 6, art. 48; DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 215, § 
5.6.7.2 (“The attack of the object must, ‘in the circumstances ruling at the time,’ offer a 
definite military advantage for the object to be considered a military objective.”); SASSÒLI, 
supra note 3, at 30, ¶ 3.39 (“[A]n attack may only be directed at legitimate targets. Legitimate 
targets include . . . military objectives . . . .”). 
163. AP 1, supra note 6, art. 57(2)(a)(ii); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 
198–99, § 5.4.2 (“Combatants must take feasible precautions in planning and conducting 
attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and other persons and objects protected from 
being made the object of attack.”); SASSÒLI, supra note 3, at 31, ¶ 3.41; Corn & Corn, supra 
note 61, at 348 (“Precautions in the attack require that commanders utilize feasible measures 
for the purpose of mitigating the risk to the civilian population (such as issuing warnings or 
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the human shields is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct an-
ticipated military advantage, the attack complies with LOAC and is therefore 
lawful.164 Where the available information supports the conclusion that the 
enemy sought to exploit both the presence of civilians as human shields165 
and the decision by its opponent to launch the attack with the knowledge it 
would result in casualties to them, that attack is essentially being used by the 
opponent to cause unlawful death or injury to those used as shields.166 Ac-
cordingly, the attack should be attributed to the party baiting it and the con-
duct should qualify as a deliberate attack on civilians.167 
 
V. WHY APPLYING THIS DOCTRINE WILL ENHANCE CONDEMNATION OF 
CIVILIAN EXPLOITATION 
 
In response to the tendency of some organized armed groups to exploit ci-
vilians for tactical or strategic advantage, States should seek to leverage all 
                                                                                                                      
timing the attack to minimize civilian exposure).”); Schmitt & Widmar, supra note 58, at 400 
(“[A] general obligation, known as the requirement to take precautions in attack, is opera-
tionalized in a number of specific rules.”). 
164. AP 1, supra note 6, art. 57(2)(a)(iii); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 
198–99, § 5.4.2 (“Combatants must refrain from attacks in which the expected loss of life 
or injury to civilians, and damage to civilian objects incidental to the attack, would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.”); 
SASSÒLI, supra note 3, at 30–31, ¶ 3.40 
[A]n attack that uses lawful means and methods of warfare directed against a legitimate 
target nonetheless is unlawful if it ‘may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’ by the attack-
ing party. 
Corn & Corn, supra note 61, at 348 (“Indiscriminate attacks—attacks on a lawful object 
that are anticipated to produce collateral damage or incidental injury that is excessive in 
relation to the legitimate anticipated value of the attacks—are also prohibited by the 
LOAC.”); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150; GREEN, supra note 17, at 351. 
165. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 11, at 285, § 5.16.5 (“The party that em-
ploys human shields in an attempt to shield military objectives from attack assumes respon-
sibility for their injury, although the attacker may share this responsibility if it fails to take 
feasible precautions.”). 
166. DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 185–86 (“It has traditionally been perceived that, should 
civilian casualties ensue from an illegal attempt to shield combatants or a military objective, 
the ultimate responsibility lies with the Belligerent Party placing civilians at risk. A Belliger-
ent Party is not vested by LOIAC with the power to block an otherwise lawful attack against 
combatants or military objectives by deliberately placing civilians in harm’s way.”); see also 
Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98. 
167. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98; DINSTEIN, supra note 1, at 185–86. 
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possible mechanisms to discredit this practice and, where feasible, to impose 
criminal responsibility on those who employ it. The U.S. Congress enacted 
legislation to impose economic sanctions on those responsible for the use of 
human shields in the 2018 Sanctioning the Use of Civilians as Defenseless 
Shields Act.168 Similarly, NATO member States have been encouraged to 
explore domestic legal mechanisms for sanctioning this practice.169 Moreo-
ver, armed forces engaged in hostilities against enemies that employ this tac-
tic seem to appreciate more than ever the importance of disclosing opera-
tional information to expose their enemy’s employment of this unlawful ac-
tivity.170 
Analogizing the concept of innocent instrumentality to situations involv-
ing a concerted effort to produce civilian casualties will contribute to this 
condemnation by characterizing this tactic for what it truly is—a deliberate 
attack on civilians. Further, it will offset the tendency to conflate direct cause 
and legal responsibility for civilian casualties, recognizing that legal respon-
sibility may properly be attributed to the indirect cause of harm in certain 
circumstances. By providing a rational explanation for why the party that 
exploited civilians should be treated as the party responsible for the attack 
causing the harm, this approach will clarify the focus of LOAC compliance 
                                                                                                                      
168. Sanctioning the Use of Civilians as Defenseless Shields Act, Pub. L. No. 115-348, 
132 Stat. 5055 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (2018)). 
169. Mark Dubowitz & Orde Kittrie, Get Serious About Human Shields, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/get-serious-about-human-
shields-1534977827 (“Sanctions for using human shields could lead to prosecution in Eu-
ropean courts and counter false claims that Western democracies are to blame for harm to 
these civilians.”). 
170. Military Advocate General’s Corps, Israel Defense Forces, Decisions of the IDF 
Military Advocate General Regarding Exceptional Incidents that Allegedly Occurred Dur-
ing Operation ‘Protective Edge’ – Update No. 6, at 6 (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.idf. 
il/media/40288/examination_and_investigation_of_exceptional_incidents_from_opera-
tion_protective_edge.pdf 
Accordingly, a central aspect of the assessment teams’ activities was to identify the specific 
incidents in relation to which it was alleged . . . that civilians were harmed, and to cross 
reference them with the positions and actions of IDF forces operating in the area, in an 
attempt to achieve a full and complete factual understanding of the events, to the extent 
possible. In furtherance of their objective, numerous reports and publications by various 
NGOs and international organizations were comprehensively analyzed, and the details 
therein were assessed against the information in the IDF’s possession. The factual picture 
that was presented to the MAG Corps by the FFA Mechanism, both with respect to the 
overall conduct of the fighting, as well as with respect to specific incidents that occurred in 
its course, was the product of a consolidation of all of the internal and external data col-
lected with respect to these incidents. 
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and non-compliance more effectively than the generalized condemnation of 
human shielding. 
In practice, an assertion of this theory of legal responsibility will not only 
highlight the unlawful conduct of the defending force, but it will also prior-
itize LOAC compliance by the attacking force. This is because the attribution 
of harm to the defending force will be contingent on clearly establishing the 
legality of an attack anticipated to cause civilian casualties. As a result, the 
attacking force will have an interest in providing information that both es-
tablishes the unlawful exploitation of civilians by the enemy as well as the 
basis for its assessment of attack legality. Thus, the “legitimacy narrative” of 
the military operation will be enhanced because the focus of that narrative 
will not be the effects of an attack, but the efforts by one party to comply 
with the law to offset the efforts of another party to violate the law. 
Utilizing the innocent instrumentality doctrine may also contribute to 
criminal accountability for the infliction of harm to civilians. By treating such 
exploitation as a deliberate attack on civilians, the gravity of the LOAC vio-
lation would produce a more compelling interest in pursuing criminal ac-
countability efforts than the conduct offense of human shielding. Where a 
defendant employs human shields for only a shielding effect, condemnation 
for that offense is logical. However, where the evidence supports the con-
clusion that the civilian exploitation tactic was intended to compel an oppo-
nent to launch an attack that produces civilian casualties, the individual mak-
ing that decision should be accountable not only for a conduct crime, but 
for a crime that focuses on the unlawful result of the misconduct.171 That 
intended result is the infliction of death or injury to the individuals used as 
human shields.172 Accordingly, the individuals making that decision should 
face trial and punishment for a deliberate attack on civilians or other pro-
tected persons. 
Both the exploitation of protected persons and the conduct of an oppo-
nent baited into launching an attack that will cause death or injury to those 
persons is deserving of the most forceful condemnation. The innocent in-
strumentality concept provides the foundation for that condemnation and 
should be leveraged to full effect. 
 
                                                                                                                      
171. Rubinstein & Roznai, supra note 34, at 98. 
172. Id. at 109. 
